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ABSTRACT 
 
The mandatory adoption of IFRS has been encouraged worldwide, with the objective to enhance 
the quality of accounting information.  However, this effort is challenged by the argument that 
several factors affecting financial reporting incentives still vary across countries.  Also, Gaio 
(2010) indicates that firm-level factors also have significant explanatory power on earning 
quality.  Therefore, it is doubtful whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS can always lead to 
better quality of accounting information.   
 
This paper examines the effect of country-level and firm-level factors on value relevance of 
earnings and book value of equity.  Among several country-level factors, this paper focuses on 
investor protection - proxied by anti-director right index (La Porta et al., 1998).  In this study, 
firm-level factors refer to firm characteristics which allow or induce high use of managerial 
discretion.  These characteristics are proxied by firm size, cash flow volatility, sales volatility, and 
incidence of negative earnings.   
 
Different from prior literatures which focus on “level” of value relevance, this paper examines the 
effect of country-level and firm-level factors on “change” in value relevance of earnings and book 
value of equity, arisen from the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the year 2005.  By comparing 
value relevance of earnings and book value of equity among European Union countries during the 
years 1999-2007, the results indicate that the adoption of IFRS leads to improvement in value 
relevance.  In addition, both country-level and firm-level factors have significant influence on the 
degree of improvement in value relevance from the IFRS adoption.  In particular, the firms which 
operate in a weak investor protection environment and have firm characteristics which induce or 
allow the managers to use high managerial discretion (i.e., small size, high cash flow volatility, 
high sales volatility, and frequent incidences of loss) do not experience significant improvement in 
value relevance from IFRS adoption. 
 
The results imply that the IFRS adoption does not ensure better quality of accounting information. 
The improvement of the quality of accounting information depends on both country and firm 
characteristics, which influence financial reporting incentives.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ccounting standard harmonization has become an important issue worldwide, as evidenced by the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in several countries as well as the effort toward convergence of IFRS 
and U.S. GAAP.  Accounting standard harmonization is motivated with the objective to enhance 
the usefulness of accounting information, in term of relevance and comparability. The importance of accounting 
standard is evidenced in several prior studies.  Their findings suggest that the quality of accounting information 
A 
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varies across different accounting standards (Alford et al., 1993; Joos and Lang, 1994) and the quality of accounting 
information is better for firms adopting IAS or U.S. GAAP than those adopting domestic accounting standards 
(Amir et al., 1993; Auer, 1996; Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Barth et al., 2008).    
 
However, many researchers question the success of current accounting standard harmonization efforts, 
especially in the environment where several factors affecting the financial report preparer‟s incentives remain 
unchanged and vary across countries and firms.  In term of country-level factor, prior literature indicates that legal 
and market factors determine investor protection (La Porta et al., 1997 and 1998), which influences the financial 
report preparer‟s incentives to choose accounting policy and to exercise their managerial discretion.  In turn, legal 
and market factors affect the quality of accounting information (for example, Ali and Hwang, 2000; Hung, 2001; 
Fan and Wong, 2002; Luez et al., 2003).  Therefore, under different legal and market structure which leads to 
different level of investor protection mechanisms, the expected outcome from accounting standard harmonization 
may not be achieved if accounting standard convergence occurs on paper only, rather than at practice level.   
 
In addition to country-level factor, earnings quality is related to firm characteristics (Gaio, 2010).  Firm 
characteristics can determine level of uncertainty and, in turn, the degree of managerial discretion the financial 
report preparer can exercise (Dechow and Dichev, 2002).  High cash flow volatility and high sales volatility imply 
greater uncertainty in the firm‟s operation, which provides opportunity for the managers to use greater judgment.  In 
addition, firm size influences level of information search by investors and financial analysts.  More information 
search is expected for large firm, resulting in high demand for accounting information.  Since these firm 
characteristics can influence the financial report preparer‟s incentive, and in turn, the quality of accounting 
information, it is doubtful whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS leads to similar improvement for firms with 
different characteristics.  
 
To examine the impact of country-level and firm-level factors on the effectiveness of IFRS adoption, this 
study evaluates the change in value relevance of earnings and book value of equity during pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption under different country-level and firm-level characteristics.  Value relevance of earnings and book value of 
equity is used as a proxy for the quality of accounting information.  Given the importance on capital markets, value-
relevant information is useful for investors in evaluating the past, present and future of the firms and in making 
equity investment decision.     
 
The scope of this study focuses on listed firms in European Union countries during the year 1999 to 2007.  
Listed firms in European Union (EU) countries have been required to prepare their financial reports according to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), starting from the year 2005.  Therefore, pre- vs post-IFRS 
adoption test under this setting (Pre-IFRS period: years 1999-2004 vs Post-IFRS period: years 2005-2007) allows us 
to measure the improvement in value relevance resulting from IFRS adoption.  
 
The sample is partitioned into 4 groups depending on the scores of their country-level and firm-level 
factors.  For country-level factor, we use anti-director right index by La Porta et al. (1998) to represent level of 
investor protection.  A set of firm characteristics (i.e. firm size, cash flow from operation volatility, sales volatility, 
and incidence of negative earnings) are used to compute firm-level score, since prior literature indicates that these 
firm characteristics influence the use of managerial discretion.  Then, for each groups, we run price regression for 
pre- and post-IFRS period to measure the change in value relevance of earnings and book value of equity. 
 
 Our evidence suggests that the adoption of IFRS leads to improvement in value relevance in all cases 
except the case where the firms operate in weak investor protection environment and have firm characteristics which 
induce or allow the managers to use high managerial discretion (i.e. small firm size, high cash flow volatility, high 
sales volatility, and more frequent incidence of negative earnings). The result highlights the importance of both 
country-level and firm-level factors on the effectiveness of IFRS adoption.   
 
This study has contributions to accounting literature. Different from prior literatures which focus on “level” 
of value relevance, this paper examines the effect of “both country-level and firm-level factors” on “change” in 
value relevance of earnings and book value of equity, resulting from the mandatory adoption of IFRS.  This study 
extends existing researches on IFRS adoption by incorporating both country-level and firm-level factors into the 
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analysis.  Our findings provide useful information in response to current trend of accounting standard 
harmonization.  The findings that value relevance improves after the shift to IFRS guarantee the benefit of current 
accounting standard harmonization efforts, i.e. the mandatory adoption of IFRS.  On the other hand, our findings 
that the improvement does not always occur but depends on country-level and firm-level characteristics, challenge 
the effort of accounting standard harmonization.   
 
The findings also have implications for standard setters and users of accounting information.  The 
mandatory adoption of IFRS does not guarantee high quality of accounting information, especially in case where 
firm characteristics induce or allow the managers to use high managerial discretion.  This is consistent with prior 
studies, which found that earning quality can be affected by firm characteristics.  Moreover, the findings highlight 
the importance of investor protection as a tool to reduce the financial report preparer‟s incentives to manipulate 
accounting numbers.  Therefore, it is important for standard setters and regulators to strengthen their market and 
legal mechanisms in order to enhance investor protection and to ensure the compliance with standards.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT   
 
The quality of accounting information has been extensively investigated by using different properties, 
ranging from value relevance, timeliness and conservatism, accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings 
predictability, and earnings smoothness.  Prior literatures found that these accounting information attributes are 
affected by several factors, such as accounting standard (Alford et al., 1993; Joos and Lang, 1994; Amir et al., 1993; 
Auer, 1996; Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Barth et al., 2008), country-level factors such as legal and market structure 
(Boonlert-U-Thai et al., 2006; Ali and Hwang, 2000; Hung, 2001; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Defond et al., 
2007), and firm-level factors (Gaio, 2010).  In this paper, pre- vs post-IFRS adoption test allows us to investigate the 
effect of accounting standard on value relevance of earnings and book value of equity – our chosen proxy for the 
quality of accounting information.  More importantly, we incorporate country-level and firm-level factors to 
examine whether the improvement (if any) in value relevance, resulting from IFRS adoption, depends on country-
level and firm-level factors.   
 
Country-level Factor 
 
Ball (2006) expressed concerns that IFRS implementation may not be equal across different countries, 
since their legal and market factors remain local and vary across different countries.  These legal and market factors 
play important role on the quality of accounting information, since they affect the financial report preparer‟s 
incentive.  The key mechanism behind this linkage is investor protection.   
 
In term of legal factors, legal rules and enforcement shape the degree of investor protection, which 
determines cost and benefit of expropriation against minority shareholders by controlling shareholders.  La Porta et 
al. (2000 and 2002) explain that, under the concept of “cost versus benefit of expropriation”, the insiders - both 
controlling shareholders and managers - have private benefit of control to expropriate against minority shareholders.  
However, this benefit is negatively related to investor protection.  When the level of shareholder protection is high, 
the insiders are forced to use more complicated technique in order to expropriate against minority shareholders.  
This raises cost of expropriation and reduces the insiders‟ benefit from expropriation.  As strong investor protection 
discourages the insiders to expropriate against minority shareholders, it reduces their incentives to manipulate 
accounting numbers in order to conceal their private benefits of control from the outsiders.  Therefore, strong 
investor protection is associated with high quality accounting information (for example, Hung, 2001; Luez et al., 
2003).  
 
 In terms of market factors, investor protection has an impact on corporate ownership structure and financial 
market development.  Strong investor protection reduces expropriation risk and increases investors‟ confidence.  
This results in highly-developed financial markets and diverse corporate shareholding structures, which lead to high 
demand for public information.  Prior researches (for example, Fan and Wong, 2002; Luez et al., 2003) found high 
quality of accounting information in such circumstance. 
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 Therefore, different legal and market structure in each country reflects its own level of investor protection, 
which has influence on the financial report preparer‟s incentives, and in turn, the quality of accounting information.   
 
Firm-level Factor 
 
 Gaio (2010) suggest that firm characteristics play important role in explaining the variation in earnings 
quality.  This is consistent with prior researches (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Atiase, 1985; Freeman, 1987), which 
found the association between firm characteristics and accounting information attributes.  
 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) found that accrual quality is negatively related with sales volatility and cash 
flow volatility, and is positively related with firm size.  Sales volatility and cash flow volatility imply high 
uncertainty in operating environment, while small firm size implies less stable and predictable operations the firms 
have.  In such circumstance, greater uncertainty exists, and consequently, more managerial judgment is needed, 
which could negatively affect accrual quality.  In addition, Minton (1999) found that cash flow volatility increases 
cost of external fund raising. In term of firm size, Eierle and Haller (2009) view firm size as a proxy for the number 
and heterogeneity of financial statement users.  Larger firms are associated with larger user groups and, in turn, 
higher demand for extensive and detailed information in financial statements.  In addition, firm size is conceived as 
a proxy for stakeholder structures.  Smaller firms usually reflect concentrated ownership pattern, which allows their 
shareholders to directly access information, resulting in less reliance on public financial information.  As a result, 
firm size affects incentive for private information search by investors, financial press and analysts.  Private 
information production is increasing function of firm size.  Atiase (1985) found that the information content of 
quarterly earnings releases is inversely related to firm size.  Freeman (1987) also found that magnitude of abnormal 
returns related to accounting earnings is inversely related to firm size.  Information search leads to high demand for 
accounting information, and influences the financial report preparer‟s incentive. 
 
Since these firm characteristics affect the degree of uncertainty of the firm‟s operation, funding cost, and 
the degree of information search by investors and financial analysts, these firm characteristics influence the financial 
report preparer‟s incentive to exercise their managerial discretion.  
 
Since investor protection and firm characteristics affect the incentive of financial report preparer, theses 
factors are more likely to have influence on the improvement in the quality of accounting information, resulting 
from IFRS adoption.  This raises concern that IFRS adoption may not always lead to improvement in the quality of 
accounting information – in this paper, value relevance.   Accordingly, null hypothesis is developed as follows: 
 
H0: Improvement in value relevance of earnings and book value of equity from IFRS adoption is significant, 
regardless of the level of investor protection in the country and the characteristics of the firms. 
 
This hypothesis could be supported by prior literatures which found that adopting international accounting 
standards improves the quality of accounting information.  However, the hypothesis could be rejected, due to fair 
value accounting embedded in IFRS.  While fair value accounting contains more information than historical cost 
accounting, it requires an increased amount of judgment, which in turn provides some room for accounting 
manipulation. Callao and Jarne (2010) found that earning management has intensified since the adoption of IFRS.  
This increased discretion raises concern over the consistency of the application of accounting standards and 
accounting manipulation. With the variation of investor protection and firm characteristics affecting the incentive of 
financial report preparers and the degree of accounting manipulation, the success of IFRS adoption could vary 
across different environment.  It is predicted that value relevance improves after IFRS adoption under the 
environment where investor protection and firm characteristics discourage accounting manipulation.  On the other 
hand, the improvement in value relevance may not occur, particularly for the firms which operate in weak investor 
protection environment and have firm characteristics that allow or induce high use of managerial discretion.  
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample 
 
The initial sample is non-financial firms, with fiscal year ending on December 31, which are listed in 
European Union stock exchanges during the years 1999 - 2007.  We include only the firms of which the country of 
incorporation is the same as the country of the stock exchange on which the firms are listed, in order to exclude 
cross-listed firms. Price and accounting data required for price regression and firm-level score computation are 
extracted from Compustat database.  The firms with incomplete data are excluded.   
 
To examine the improvement in value relevance resulting from IFRS adoption, we focus only on firms 
which changed their accounting standard from domestic accounting standards to IFRS in the year 2005.  For 
screening purpose, we use “Accounting Standard Code” available in Compustat database.  This code identifies 
accounting standards which the company uses in presenting its financial statement. DS represents “Domestic 
Standards” (which is our main focus for the years 1999 to 2004), while DI represents “Domestic standards generally 
in according to International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) guidelines” (which is our criterion for the 
years 2005 to 2007).  Outliers are identified as the top and bottom 1% of observations for each variable, and the 
firms identified as outlier are excluded from the sample.  Final sample consists of 406 firms from 15 countries 
during the years 1999-2007, or 3,654 firm-years in total. 
 
Methodology 
 
Timeframe of the analysis   
 
 In our analysis, the sample is divided into three intervals:  
 
1. From the years 1999 to 2001 (Pre-IFRS adoption).  The European Union Parliament officially announced 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the year 2002.  Standard setters and firms could prepare for the year 
2005 requirement by gradually converging their domestic accounting standards to IFRS during the years 
2002-2004.  Therefore, we extend our sample period to years 1999-2001, i.e. the period before the 
European Union Parliament officially announced the requirement for the mandatory adoption of IFRS, in 
order to exclude the effect of such preparation effort. 
2. From the years 2002 to 2004 (Preparation period).  This is also classified as the pre-IFRS adoption period, 
but it represents the period after the requirement for the mandatory adoption of IFRS was formally 
announced. 
3. From the years 2005 to 2007 (Post-IFRS adoption).   
 
Group classification   
 
 To examine the hypothesis which is related to country-level and firm-level factors, the sample is divided 
into 4 groups, depending on investor protection and firm characteristics which determine the use of managerial 
discretion.   
 
Group 1 (WH): Firms which operate in the country with weak investor protection (W) and have firm characteristics 
which allow or induce high use of managerial discretion (H). 
 
Group 2 (SH):  Firms which operate in the country with strong investor protection (S) but have firm characteristics 
which allow or induce high use of managerial discretion (H). 
 
Group 3 (WL):  Firms which operate in the country with weak investor protection (W) and have firm characteristics 
which allow or induce low use of managerial discretion (L). 
 
Group 4 (SL):  Firms which operate in the country with strong investor protection (S) and have firm characteristics 
which allow or induce low use of managerial discretion (L). 
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Figure 1:  Classification Based On Investor Protection And Firm Characteristics 
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 - Weak investor protection (W) - Strong investor protection (S)  
High - Firm characteristics which allow  - Firm characteristics which allow  204 firms 
 high use of managerial discretion (H)                high use of managerial discretion (H)                 
 Group WH (78 firms) Group SH (126 firms)  
 - Weak investor protection (W) - Strong investor protection (S)  
Low - Firm characteristics which allow  - Firm characteristics which allow   
 low use of managerial discretion (L)                low use of managerial discretion (L)                202 firms 
 Group WL (59 firms) Group SL (143 firms)  
 Total 137 firms 269 firms  
Notes:  
 
1. The sample is divided into 4 groups, based on level of investor protection and firm characteristics which determine the use 
of managerial discretion.   
 
Group WH:  Firms which operate in the country with weak investor protection (W) and have firm characteristics which 
allow/induce high use of managerial discretion (H). 
Group SH:  Firms which operate in the country with strong investor protection (S) but have firm characteristics which 
allow/induce high use of managerial discretion (H). 
Group WL:  Firms which operate in the country with weak investor protection (W) and have firm characteristics which 
allow/induce low use of managerial discretion (L). 
Group SL:  Firms which operate in the country with strong investor protection (S) and have firm characteristics which 
allow/induce low use of managerial discretion (L).  
 
2. For investor protection, anti-director rights index is used to partition the sample.  This index is developed by La Porta et al. 
(1998) to measure how well the mechanisms are in place to protect minorities shareholders.  The mean of index for our 
country sample is used as the cutoff point. S (Strong) is assigned for the countries with the score higher than the mean of 
index for our country sample, and W (Weak) is assigned for the countries with the score below mean.    
3. For firm characteristics which determine the use of managerial discretion, the score is computed based on four firm 
characteristics, i.e. average firm size, cash flow from operation volatility, sales volatility, and incidence of negative earnings.  
For each variable, the sample is ranked.  Low rank is assigned for the firms with low managerial incentive for accounting 
manipulation, i.e. large firm size, low sales volatility, low cash flow volatility and low incidence of negative earnings.  Then, 
the ranks based on these 4 variables are averaged in order to get the score.  Mean of this score is used as the cutoff point. 
 
 
Variables Used for Partitioning   
 
 In order to classify sample into four groups based on level of investor protection and firm characteristics, 
we use the following variables: 
 
1. Investor protection: The anti-director rights index, developed by La Porta et al. (1998) in order to measure 
how well the mechanisms are in place to protect minorities shareholders, is used to partition the sample.  
The mean of index for our country sample is used as the cutoff point for weak versus strong investor 
protection groups.  The median, if employed, results in the same partition.   
2. Firm characteristics: four firm characteristics used in prior research are used, i.e. firm size, cash flow 
volatility, sales volatility, and incidence of negative earnings. Size is average of total assets of each firm 
during the sample period.  Cash flow volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow from operation.  Sales 
volatility is the standard deviation of sales revenues.  Incidence of negative earnings is the number of 
negative earnings during the sample period.   
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For each variable, the sample is ranked.  Low rank is assigned for the firms with low managerial incentive 
for accounting manipulation, i.e. large firm size, low sales volatility, low cash flow volatility and low 
incidence of negative earnings.  Then, the ranks based on these 4 variables are averaged in order to get the 
score representing firm-level managerial incentive.  This score is used in partitioning.  The mean value of 
this score is used as the cut-off point.  As a result, the sample can be divided into 2 groups, i.e. those with 
the firm characteristics that allow or induce “high vs low” use of managerial discretion.   
 
Table 1 presents sample classification by level of investor protection and firms characteristics. 
 
 
Table 1:  Country Classification Based On Investor Protection And Firm Characteristics 
 Country 
Investor protection Number of firms 
Anti-director rights 
index 
Weak vs Strong 
Classified by firm characteristics 
(Use of managerial discretion) 
High Low 
1. Austria 2 W 1 1 
2. Belgium 0 W 3 5 
3. Denmark 2 W 4 4 
4. Germany 1 W 24 9 
5. Greece 2 W 8 6 
6. Italy 1 W 14 19 
7. Netherlands 2 W 24 15 
    78 59 
8. Finland 3 S 12 12 
9. France 3 S 34 51 
10. Ireland 4 S 3 4 
11. Norway 4 S 7 11 
12. Portugal 3 S 3 3 
13. Spain 4 S 0 2 
14. Sweden 3 S 15 11 
15. UK 5 S 52 49 
    126 143 
 Mean 2.6  204 202 
Notes:  
 
1. For investor protection (country-level factor), anti-director rights index is used to partition the sample.  This index is 
developed by La Porta et al. (1998) to measure how well the mechanisms are in place to protect minorities shareholders.  
The mean of index for our country sample is used as the cutoff point. S (Strong) is assigned for the countries with the score 
higher than the mean, and W (Weak) is assigned for the countries with the score below mean.    
2. For firm characteristics which determine the use of managerial discretion, the score is computed based on four firm 
characteristics, i.e. average firm size, cash flow from operation volatility, sales volatility, and incidence of negative earnings.  
For each variable, the sample is ranked.  Low rank is assigned for the firms with low managerial incentive for accounting 
manipulation, i.e. large firm size, low sales volatility, low cash flow volatility and low incidence of negative earnings.  Then, 
the ranks based on these 4 variables are averaged in order to get the score.  Mean of this score is used as the cutoff point. 
 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of four firm characteristics.  In Panel A, wide range of value of these 
variables confirms that the sample firms have apparently different characteristics, and therefore, are valid for our 
classification.  Panel B reports mean value of these firm characteristics for 2 sub-samples, classified based on the 
firm characteristics which determine the use of managerial discretion.  Group “High” (i.e. the firms of which the 
characteristics allow or induce high use of managerial discretion) has smaller average firm size, larger average cash 
flow volatility, larger average sales volatility and more frequent incidence of negative earnings than Group “Low” 
(i.e. the firms of which the characteristics allow or induce low use of managerial discretion).  The t-statistics indicate 
that mean differences are significant for all four firm characteristics.  The findings support the validity of using these 
firm characteristics for the classification. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics Of Firm Characteristics 
Panel A: Pooled Data 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Size (Total assets: USD million) 9.01 194,720.00 3,934.57 
Cash flow volatility 0.01 0.18 0.05 
Sales volatility 0.02 0.91 0.20 
Incidence of negative earnings 0 1.00 0.12 
Panel B: By Groups Classified Based on Firm Characteristics 
 Mean 
Difference t-statistics 
 High Low 
Size (Total assets: USD million) 758.88 7,141.69 (6,382.81) (15.22)** 
Cash flow volatility 0.07 0.03 0.04 37.96** 
Sales volatility 0.26 0.13 0.13 30.27** 
Incidence of negative earnings 0.18 0.06 0.12 24.85** 
Notes: 
 
1. Variable definition is as follows:   
 Size is average of total assets of each firm during the sample period (USD million).   
 Cash flow volatility is the standard deviation of cash flow from operation of each firm.   
 Sale volatility is the standard deviation of sales revenues of each firm.   
 Incidence of negative earnings is the number of negative earnings of each firm during the sample period. 
2. In Panel B, the sample is divided into 2 groups, based on firm characteristics which determine the use of managerial 
discretion.  High (Low) represents the group of firms with the characteristics that allow or induce high (low) use of 
managerial discretion. 
3. Panel B reports t-statistics for equality of means.  ** and  *  denote 5% and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed). 
 
 
Model Specification   
 
 To test the hypothesis, we examine whether there is any significant improvement in value relevance during 
three periods for each group.  Therefore, the following price regression - based on the valuation framework by 
Ohlson (1991) - will be conducted for each group and each period.   
 
Pit / BVit-1 = β0 + β1 EPSit / BVit-1  + β2 BVit / BVit-1 + β3 DYEAR2it + β4 DYEAR3it + εit   
 
where: 
 
Pit is the market price of firm i at balance sheet date t plus two months.   
BVit is book value of equity per share of firm i at year t 
EPSit is earnings per share of firm i at the end of year t.   
DYEAR2it is the dummy variable for Year 2 in each period, which is equal to 1 if time „t‟ is equal to year 2000, 
2003, or 2006, and 0 otherwise. 
DYEAR3it is the dummy variable for Year 3 in each period, which is equal to 1 if time „t‟ is equal to year 2001, 
2004, or 2007, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The improvement in value relevance is measured by the change in adjusted R
2
,
 
and Z-statistics is used to 
determine whether the difference of adjusted R
2
 between two sub-periods is significant (Harris et al., 1994; Arce and 
Mora, 2002).   
 
Z = 
R
2
1 – R
2
2 
2 (R
2
1) + 
2 
(R
2
2) 
 
R
2
1 and R
2
2 are the R
2
 from the regressions of the subsamples being compared.  2(.)  is their variance, 
which is calculated based on Cramer (1987). 
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RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics And Pearson Correlation Of Dependent And Independent Variables 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics 
  Price (Scaled) EPS (Scaled) BV (Scaled) 
Group Period   Standard   Standard   Standard 
  Mean Median deviation Mean Median deviation Mean Median deviation 
Pool Pool 2.52 1.89 2.15 0.13 0.13 0.15 1.12 1.11 0.23 
Pool 1 2.47 1.57 2.68 0.13 0.13 0.14 1.02 1.00 0.21 
 2 2.25 1.80 1.70 0.11 0.11 0.15 1.18 1.18 0.21 
 3 2.83 2.40 1.89 0.17 0.16 0.15 1.16 1.17 0.25 
WH 1 2.06 1.45 2.18 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.98 0.94 0.26 
 2 1.79 1.51 1.40 0.07 0.08 0.17 1.18 1.18 0.27 
 3 2.48 2.07 1.75 0.14 0.13 0.17 1.16 1.17 0.25 
SH 1 2.32 1.43 2.70 0.11 0.10 0.17 1.02 1.01 0.21 
 2 2.21 1.75 1.65 0.10 0.10 0.16 1.16 1.15 0.20 
 3 2.83 2.43 2.00 0.16 0.15 0.17 1.15 1.14 0.29 
WL 1 2.82 1.96 2.30 0.15 0.14 0.10 1.00 0.99 0.16 
 2 2.44 1.81 1.91 0.13 0.13 0.11 1.20 1.20 0.20 
 3 2.71 2.44 1.51 0.18 0.17 0.10 1.19 1.19 0.22 
SL 1 2.67 1.70 3.00 0.16 0.15 0.11 1.05 1.02 0.20 
 2 2.47 2.00 1.75 0.13 0.13 0.13 1.18 1.19 0.18 
 3 3.07 2.62 1.98 0.18 0.18 0.13 1.16 1.17 0.22 
Panel B:  Pearson Correlation Of Variables 
  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Group Variable (Year 1999-2001) (Year 2002-2004) (Year 2005-2007) 
  Price EPS Price EPS Price EPS 
Pool EPS 0.43**  0.59**  0.64**  
 BV 0.38** 0.53** 0.30** 0.61** 0.38** 0.51** 
WH EPS 0.33 **  0.53 **  0.58 **  
 BV 0.38** 0.45** 0.32** 0.74 ** 0.39 ** 0.56 ** 
SH EPS 0.39**  0.64 **  0.64 **  
 BV 0.44** 0.66 ** 0.46 ** 0.60 ** 0.45 ** 0.56 ** 
WL EPS 0.55**  0.58 **  0.72 **  
 BV 0.31** 0.45 ** 0.11* 0.54 ** 0.38** 0.49 ** 
SL EPS 0.53**  0.60 **  0.68 **  
 BV 0.35** 0.46 ** 0.26 ** 0.54 ** 0.32 ** 0.41** 
Notes: 
 
1.   The sample is divided into 4 groups, based on the level of investor protection and firm characteristics which determine the use of 
managerial discretion.   
 Group WH:  Firms which operate in the country with weak investor protection (W) and have firm characteristics which allow/induce 
high use of managerial discretion (H). 
 Group SH:  Firms which operate in the country with strong investor protection (S) but have firm characteristics which allow/induce 
high use of managerial discretion (H). 
 Group WL:  Firms which operate in the country with weak investor protection (W) and have firm characteristics which allow/induce 
low use of managerial discretion (L). 
 Group SL:  Firms which operate in the country with strong investor protection (S) and have firm characteristics which allow/induce 
low use of managerial discretion (L). 
2.   Variable definition is as follows:  Price is the closing price at the balance sheet date plus two months, EPS is earnings, and BV is book value 
of equity.  These variables are per share basis and scaled by the beginning-of-period book value of equity.   
3.   ** and * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 and 0.10 level (2-tailed), respectively. 
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Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on price, earnings and book value of equity.  All variables 
are scaled by book value of equity at the time t-1 in order to mitigate potential scale effect (Brown et al. 1999).  The 
means of scaled price, earnings and book value of equity are $2.52, $0.13 and $1.12, respectively.  Standard 
deviation of price is higher than that of EPS and book value of equity, implying that the volatility of price is higher 
than that of accounting data.  When dividing the sample by group and period, we found that Group WH and Group 
SH, representing the firms having characteristics which allow or induce high use of discretion, have smaller average 
value of most variables than Group WL and Group SL, representing the firms having characteristics which allow or 
induce low use of discretion.  In Panel B of Table 3, Pearson correlation of variables shows that both earnings and 
book value of equity are significantly correlated with price in all four groups and in all three periods.   
 
Regression Results 
 
Table 4 reports the regression results for the hypothesis.  Panel A shows that earnings have increasing 
explanatory power in price after IFRS adoption.  For Group WH and Group SH (i.e. the firms with characteristics 
that allow or induce high use of discretion), earning is not value-relevant during pre-IFRS adoption period (period 
1), but become value-relevant after the official announcement of IFRS requirement (during period 2 and 3).  During 
period 2 and period 3, earnings become value-relevant in all groups. 
 
Panel B reports adjusted R
2
 of price regression, which is our measure for value relevance of earnings and 
book value of equity.  The comparison of adjusted R
2
 shows that there is significant improvement in adjusted R
2
 
after IFRS adoption for all groups, except Group WH.  From period 1 (pre-IFRS adoption period) to period 3 (after 
IFRS adoption), adjusted R
2
 of Group SH, Group WL and Group SL increase by 0.19 to 0.22.  On the other hand, 
adjusted R
2
 of Group WH increases by only 0.11, which is insignificant.  This is consistent with our prediction that 
the firms which have the characteristics that allow/induce high use of managerial discretion and operate under weak 
investor protection environment are less likely to experience the improvement in value relevance after IFRS 
adoption. 
 
Our findings have at least 2 implications.  First, the result suggests that firm characteristics have important 
influence on the improvement in value relevance, resulting from IFRS adoption.  This is evidenced as Group WL 
and Group SL, which have firm characteristics that allow or induce low use of discretion, experience significant 
improvement in value relevance (Adjusted R
2 
increase from period 1 to period 3 by 0.21 and 0.19).  On the other 
hand, Group WH, which has the firm characteristics that allow or induce high use of discretion, does not exhibit any 
significant improvement in value relevance (Adjusted R
2 
insignificantly increases from period 1 to period 3 by 0.11).  
Such difference highlights the importance of firm characteristics on the effectiveness of IFRS adoption.   
 
Although Group WH and Group SH have similar firm characteristics which allow or induce high use of 
managerial discretion, their outcomes of IFRS adoption are different.  Significant improvement is found in Group 
SH which operates in strong investor protection environment, but not in Group WH which operates in weak investor 
protection environment (Adjusted R
2 
increase from period 1 to period 3 by 0.11 for Group WH and by 0.22 for 
Group SH).  This findings lead to the second implication that investor protection can help reduce the degree of 
managerial discretion, which may arise from firm characteristics that allow or induce high use of managerial 
discretion. 
 
Additional analysis is conducted by comparing value relevance between different groups in each period.  
The result in Panel C shows that there is no significant difference in value relevance among four groups in Period 1 
(before IFRS adoption).  However, after IFRS adoption (Period 3), adjusted R
2
 of Group WH is the lowest at level 
of 0.34 and is significantly different from those of the remaining 3 groups, of which adjusted R
2 
are 0.45 to 0.52.  
The adjusted R
2
 of Group WH is significantly lower than those of the remaining three groups by 0.11 to 0.18.  On 
the other hand, the difference of adjusted R
2
 among Group SH, Group WL, and Group SL are insignificant (the 
difference ranges from 0.04 to 0.07).  The results suggest that the significant difference between Group WH and the 
remaining three groups occurs after IFRS adoption (Period 3).  Consistent with Panel B, Panel C indicates that 
Group WL, SH, and SL show superior improvement in value relevance to Group WH after IFRS adoption.  
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Table 4:  Effect Of The Mandatory Adoption Of IFRS On Value Relevance Of Earnings And Book Value Of Equity, 
Conditional On Investor Protection And Firm Characteristics 
 
Pit / BVit-1 = β0 + β1 EPSit / BVit-1  + β2 BVit / BVit-1 + β3 DYEAR2it + β4 DYEAR3it + εit 
 
Panel A:  Co-efficient of Regressions – by Group and Period 
  Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Group  EPS BV EPS BV EPS BV 
WH Co-efficient 2.44 2.83 5.13 (0.75) 5.25 0.68 
 t-statistics 1.32 1.58 4.95** (1.69)* 4.75** 1.07 
SH Co-efficient 2.28 4.64 5.32 1.35 6.56 0.96 
 t-statistics 1.72* 4.11** 8.67** 3.07** 9.38** 2.07** 
WL Co-efficient 11.39 1.29 12.64 (2.77) 10.34 0.15 
 t-statistics 7.08** 1.29 10.14** (3.98)** 11.44** 0.27 
SL Co-efficient 12.07 2.19 8.72 (0.76) 10.50 0.28 
 t-statistics 5.02** 2.54** 6.14** (1.00) 8.77** 0.51 
Panel B:  Comparison Of Adjusted R2 Between Different Periods 
 Adjusted R2 Difference of R2 between period 
Group Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 1 vs 2 2 vs 3 1 vs 3 
WH 0.23 0.32 0.34 0.08 0.02 0.11 
SH 0.23 0.47 0.45 0.24** (0.02) 0.22** 
WL 0.31 0.38 0.52 0.07 0.14** 0.21** 
SL 0.29 0.39 0.49 0.10** 0.09** 0.19** 
Panel C:  Difference Of Adjusted R2 Among Different Groups (By Period) 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
 Difference of R2 between Difference of R2 between Difference of R2 between 
Group WH SH WL WH SH WL WH SH WL 
SH (0.002)   0.154**   0.109*   
WL 0.075 0.077  0.064 (0.09)  0.183** 0.074  
SL 0.055 0.057 (0.020) 0.075 (0.079)* 0.011 0.145** 0.036 (0.038) 
Notes:   
1.   Variable definition are as follows:  P is the closing price at the balance sheet date plus two months,  EPS is earnings, and BV is book value 
of equity.  These variables are per share basis and scaled by the beginning-of-period book value of equity.  DYEAR2 is the dummy variable 
for Year 2 in each period, which is equal to 1 for the year 2000, 2003, and 2006; and 0 otherwise.  DYEAR3 is the dummy variable for Year 
3 in each period, which is equal to 1 for the year 2001, 2004, and 2007; and 0 otherwise. 
2.   The sample is divided into 4 sub-samples, based on investor protection and firm characteristics which determine the use of managerial 
discretion, which are as follows: 
 Group WH:  Firms which are in the country with weak investor protection (W) and have firm characteristics which allow/induce high 
use of managerial discretion (H). 
 Group SH:  Firms which are in the country with strong investor protection (S) but have firm characteristics which allow/induce high 
use of managerial discretion (H). 
 Group WL:  Firms which are in the country with weak investor protection (W) and have firm characteristics which allow/induce low 
use of managerial discretion (L). 
 Group SL:  Firms which are in the country with strong investor protection (S) and have firm characteristics which allow/induce low 
use of managerial discretion (L). 
3.   For the purpose of partitioning, investor protection is represented by anti-director rights index (La Porta et al., 1998).   
For firm-level factor, the score is computed based on four firm characteristics, i.e. average firm size, cash flow from operation volatility, 
sales volatility, and incidence of negative earnings.  For each variable, the sample is ranked.  Low rank is assigned for the firms with low 
managerial incentive for accounting manipulation, i.e. large firm size, low sales volatility, low cash flow volatility and low incidence of 
negative earnings.  Then, the ranks based on these 4 variables are averaged in order to get the score. Mean of this score is used as the cutoff 
point. 
4.   When heteroscedasticity problem is identified, standard errors are calculated using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent variance-
covariance matrix. 
5.  To determine whether adjusted R-squares of two sub-samples are significantly different, Z-statistics are calculated to estimate the 
probability to accept null hypothesis of equality of R2 (Harris et al., 1994 and Arce and Mora, 2002).   
 
Z = 
R
2
1 – R
2
2 
2 (R
2
1) + 
2 
(R
2
2) 
 
R21 and R
2
2 are the R
2 from the regressions of the subsamples being compared.  2(.)  is their variance, which is calculated based on Cramer 
(1987). 
6.   ** and * denote 5% and 10% significance, respectively (two-tailed). 
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 In sum, the findings provide supporting evidence for the improvement in value relevance after the adoption 
of IFRS in most cases.  However, whether IFRS adoption leads to the improvement in value relevance depends on 
both level of investor protection (country-level factor) and firm characteristics which determine the use of 
managerial discretion (firm-level factor).   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 We investigate the effect of country-level and firm-level factors on the effectiveness of IFRS adoption by 
European Union countries.  To determine whether IFRS adoption leads to improvement in the quality of accounting 
information, we use value relevance of earnings and book value of equity as our proxy for the quality of accounting 
information.   
 
 The analysis provides evidence that there is improvement in value relevance after IFRS adoption.  This is 
consistent with prior literature which suggests that adopting international accounting standards leads to better quality 
of accounting information.  However, among the sub-samples with different level of investor protection and 
different firm characteristics, we do not find any significant improvement in value relevance for the firms which 
operate in weak investor protection environment and have firm characteristics which allow or induce high use of 
managerial discretion.   
 
 Our findings suggest that whether IFRS adoption leads to the improvement in value relevance depends on 
level of investor protection (country-level factor) and firm characteristics (firm-level factor).  The results report 
significant improvement in value relevance for Group SH, but not for Group WH.  While both groups have firm 
characteristics which allow or induce high use of managerial discretion, the firms in strong investor protection 
environment (Group SH) still exhibit significant improvement.  The findings highlight the importance of investor 
protection.  Investor protection can help reduce the financial report preparer‟s incentive for accounting 
manipulation, which may arise from firm characteristics that allow or induce high use of managerial discretion.  This 
is consistent with prior literature that the quality of accounting information is higher in strong investor protection 
environment (Hung, 2001).  
 
 In term of firm-level factor, our results suggest that firm characteristics can also affect the improvement 
from IFRS adoption, particularly when the firms operate in weak investor protection environment.  In such case, 
without investor protection, there is no mechanism to reduce the incentive of the managers to expropriate against 
minorities, and in turn, their incentives to manipulate accounting numbers to conceal their fraud.  Therefore, in weak 
investor protection environment, firm characteristics play important influence on the degree of improvement in 
value relevance, resulting from IFRS adoption.  
 
Our findings have implications for standard setters and investors. The evidence that value relevance of 
accounting information improves after the mandatory adoption of IFRS supports the current effort of national 
standard setters to converge their accounting standards to IFRS.  However, our findings also highlight the 
importance of other factors which could affect the financial report preparer‟s incentive, for example, investor 
protection and firm characteristics.   
 
It reminds national standard setters about the importance of investor protection.  In the case where the firm 
have characteristics which induce high use of managerial discretion (for example, high cash flow volatility, high 
sales volatility, frequent incidence of losses),  investor protection can be an effective tool to reduce the financial 
report preparer‟s incentive for accounting manipulation.  Therefore, it is important for national standard setters not 
to just adopt IFRS on paper but to simultaneously strengthen investor protection– through both legal and market 
mechanism – in order to promote the compliance with the standards.   
 
Also, our findings raise awareness to investors and other financial report users that they should not be 
misled by the word “accounting standard harmonization”.  The mandatory adoption of IFRS does not guarantee 
consistent implementation of IFRS across firms, since there are other factors which affect the financial report 
preparer‟s incentive, and in turn, their accounting practices.  Caution is needed, especially when reading financial 
reports of the firms, of which the characteristics allow or induce high use of managerial discretion.  This is 
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especially important when investor protection is weak, as there is no mechanism to reduce high use of managerial 
discretion. 
 
 However, our study has limitations in term of unavailability of data used to calculate firm-level score.  
While four firm characteristics (i.e. firm size, cash flow volatility, sales volatility, and incidence of negative 
earnings) are used in this paper, future research can include other relevant firm characteristics, for example, earnings 
volatility, length of operating cycle, investment opportunities, and insider ownership.  In addition, the analysis can 
be extended to other attributes of accounting quality, such as conservatism or earnings management.  
 
Our findings highlight the importance of investor protection.  Other aspects of legal and market factors 
which affect the investor protection can be explored.  For example, the effectiveness of securities market regulator 
can affect accounting practices of accounting professionals.  As the incentive of other stakeholders involved in 
financial reporting process under fair value accounting, for example auditor or real estate appraiser, can influence 
the quality of accounting information, regulation and enforcement governing these stakeholders should be explored.  
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